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scenarios for Western European countries. Our simulations show that flat tax rates required 
to attain revenue neutrality with existing basic allowances improve labour supply incentives. 
However, they result in higher inequality and polarisation. Flat rates necessary to keep the 
inequality levels unchanged allow for some scope for flat taxes to increase both equity and 
efficiency. Our analysis suggests that Mediterranean countries are more likely to benefit from 
flat taxes. 
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Flat income tax, referring broadly to a tax with a single marginal rate, is becoming increasingly
popular. Before the 1990s it was only applied in a few countries, most prominently Hong Kong
and the Channel Islands. Since 1994 however, after its introduction in Estonia, a number of
countries have followed suit. In 2008 there were altogether 26 countries worldwide with ￿ at
tax systems, of which about half are in Eastern Europe, and such proposals being discussed
in several other countries including some in Western Europe.1 However, among the latter only
Iceland recently adopted a ￿ at tax.
There are three main bene￿ts usually associated with ￿ at tax systems. First, ￿ at taxes may
enhance labour supply incentives. Although there is a trend of lowering marginal statutory tax
rates (and reducing the number of tax brackets), top rates can still be rather high in existing
systems, e.g. around 40-60% in EU15 (see Eurostat (2007)). While the gains from lower and
￿ at tax rates are explicit for the top income range, they are not so obvious for low incomes. The
results here depend on the chosen ￿ at tax parameters and the underlying income distribution.
Second, a ￿ at tax can increase tax compliance and reduce tax evasion. This argument is perhaps
weaker in developed countries, but it is often central for this kind of reform in developing and
transition countries. Third, as a ￿ at tax is often a part of more fundamental tax reform, it can
simplify income taxation signi￿cantly. The current systems in Europe have typically evolved
to quite complex entities, often violating the principle that taxes ought to be clear and simple.
A simpler system is not only easier to grasp from the point of view of a single taxpayer, but
is also more transparent at the aggregated level. Simpli￿cation can also decrease the costs of
administration and compliance.
However, ￿ at taxes can have a serious drawback in terms of their impact on the distribution
of tax burdens which could be the main reason limiting its spread in developed countries with a
well established middle class. Previous ￿ at tax reforms and typical proposals lower marginal tax
rates at the high income levels but increase the tax burden for middle-income ranges, resulting
in a widening of the distribution of after-tax incomes.
Only two actual reforms have been examined in the literature: the 2001 Russian reform
by Ivanova et al. (2005) and the 2004 reform in the Slovak Republic by, among others, Brook
and Leibfritz (2005). In the Russian case, the reform was followed by signi￿cant real growth
in personal income tax revenue, but there was no strong evidence that this was caused by the
reform itself or by improved law enforcement, nor could any positive labour supply responses
be identi￿ed.2 The Slovakian reform was expected to be revenue neutral, to increase the level
1Cf. Keen et al. (2007), Nicodeme (2007) and Mitchell (2007). See also Figure 11 in Appendix A.
2See also Gaddy and Gale (2005) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2007). Furthermore, the situation in Russia is
di⁄erent in comparison to Western European countries insofar as the latter have a long tradition of taxation and
1and e¢ ciency of capital formation and enhance the incentives of unemployed workers to seek
work. However, no evidence apart from revenue-neutrality has been reported yet. While it is
true that most real world reforms have been very recent, research on their e⁄ects is probably
also limited due to the lack in those countries of high-quality (micro-)data for the pre-reform
period.
In the discussion of the ￿ at tax ￿a notable and troubling feature [...] is that it has been
marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence￿.3 Given that ￿ at taxes
have not yet been implemented in Western countries, the e⁄ects of ￿ at tax reforms in these
countries can only be studied on the basis of simulation models. There have been several
previous studies, focussing on a single country and hypothetical reforms in most cases. In
a study for the Netherlands, Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) derive the result that a ￿ at
tax would yield redistribution at the expense of the lowest income deciles, but the magnitude
of these e⁄ects is quite small. Several studies, like Aaberge et al. (2000) for Italy, Norway
and Sweden, Kuismanen (2000) for Finland, Adam and Browne (2006) for the UK, GonzÆlez-
Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) for Spain4, and Decoster and Orsini (2007) for Belgium,
￿nd that, in addition to redistribution in favour of high income households, the hypothetical
introduction of a ￿ at tax would increase labour supply (incentives). Benedek and Lelkes (2007)
simulate a ￿ at tax reform for Hungary. They do not consider work incentives but also ￿nd
that the reform would lead to a sharp increase in after tax income inequality. Fuest et al.
(2008) show for Germany that a ￿ at tax with a high basic allowance and a single rate has less
harmful distributional e⁄ects than a ￿ at tax with a low rate. The latter scenario, however,
is the only alternative that leads to positive, albeit small, labour supply and welfare e⁄ects.
Jacobs et al. (2007) analyse two revenue neutral ￿ at tax scenarios on the basis of a computable
general equilibrium model calibrated for the Netherlands. The low ￿ at rate scenario increases
inequality because taxes on low incomes increase whereas high income earners bene￿t. There
are positive e⁄ects on employment, which increases by 1.4 per cent. In the second scenario, the
general tax credit and the marginal rate are higher. Now, also low incomes bene￿t due to the
higher tax credit, while very high incomes gain less than in the low tax scenario. Middle income
households, however, face an increasing tax burden. Aggregate labour supply and employment
fall.
The aim of this paper is to undertake a systematic approach for choosing ￿ at tax parameters
a rather large tax administration to ensure tax compliance. Therefore, we assume e⁄ects of a ￿ at tax reform
on compliance to be less important than in transition countries of Eastern Europe.
3Keen et al. (2007), p. 3.
4The ￿ndings in GonzÆlez-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) di⁄er from the other country studies in the
magnitude of the simulated e¢ ciency gains. While most studies ￿nd rather small gains, their model predicts an
increase in output by more than 5%. They argue that this is driven mostly by an increase in capital formation,
not in employment.
2for a comparative analysis of di⁄erent ￿ at tax designs for selected Western European countries.
Davies and Hoy (2002) show that in the case of revenue neutral ￿ at tax reforms there are two sets
of critical parameter values: a lower bound of the ￿ at tax rate below which inequality is always
higher compared to a given graduated rate tax, and an upper bound above which inequality
is always lower. We rely on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical
￿ at tax reforms and analyse the distributional and incentive e⁄ects of their implementation in
European countries.
We use EUROMOD, a tax-bene￿t microsimulation model for the EU15, to compare the
results across countries in a common framework. Among others, we study the e⁄ects on polar-
isation, which can be used as an indicator of the strength of the middle class. We ask whether
di⁄erent combinations of tax rates and allowances always have an adverse e⁄ect on the middle
class and if there are indeed positive incentive e⁄ects. We concentrate on the short-term static
e⁄ects assuming that these decide the political feasibility of a tax reform although there are
possibly important long-term e⁄ects as well.5
Our analysis yields the following results. The ￿ at tax rates required to attain revenue
neutrality with existing basic allowances (lower boundary) improve labour supply incentives.
However, they bene￿t mainly those with high incomes at the expense of low and middle income
households, resulting in more inequality, poverty and polarisation of the income distributions.
On the other hand, revenue neutral ￿ at rates necessary to keep the inequality levels unchanged
are rather high and lead to ambiguous incentive e⁄ects. In general, a revenue neutral ￿ at
tax reform cannot overcome the fundamental equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄, but in some cases an
increase in equality and work incentives is possible. We show that the di⁄erent underlying
income distributions and compositions of welfare state regimes play a key role for the results
in terms of both equity and e¢ ciency. Overall, this could contribute to explaining why ￿ at
taxes have not been politically successful in Western Europe so far. This also suggests that
Mediterranean countries with a rather small middle-class due to high polarisation are more
likely to bene￿t from such a reform.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a discussion on the ￿ at
tax design. Section 3 contains a short description of the model, datasets and our reform
scenarios. Section 4 illustrates the distributional e⁄ects in terms of inequality, poverty and
richness, polarisation, winners and losers as well as the incentive e⁄ects in terms of e⁄ective
marginal and average tax rates. Section 5 concludes.
5People tend to judge future gains and losses asymmetrically (see e.g. the ￿prospect theory￿ by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)). Starting from a reference point (status quo) and given the same variation in absolute
values, there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion). Furthermore, people prefer the status quo
over uncertain outcomes in the future (￿status-quo-bias￿, see Kahneman et al. (1991)). Therefore, short-term
losses in comparison to the status quo can have a much stronger impact than (possible) future gains. Hence,
the short term e⁄ects presented here could be decisive.
32 Flat tax design
Flat tax implies that some sort of proportionality is embedded in the income tax system, i.e.
income is taxed at the same (￿ at) rate along the whole range of income. Its design, however,
can be very di⁄erent. There are two dimensions to be distinguished: tax schedule and tax base.
In general, a tax schedule can apply the same rate on all sources of income (i.e. comprehensive
tax) or di⁄erent rates on di⁄erent types of incomes (i.e. schedular tax). Most countries with a
￿ at tax system apply di⁄erent rates to personal and corporate income, although a common rate
has become more popular among the countries recently implementing these systems. Usually,
the tax rate does not vary for components of personal income, i.e. capital and labour income is
taxed at the same marginal rate independent of the level of income. There is also a number of
countries which tax only capital income at a ￿ at rate and levy a progressive rate schedule on
labour income. However, these are usually not considered as ￿ at tax systems but dual or semi-
dual income tax systems.6 For the tax base one can di⁄erentiate between concepts allowing
or not allowing for any allowances or deductions. Certainly, only the ￿ at tax without any tax
reliefs is a ￿pure￿￿ at tax as in this case tax payments are indeed proportional to incomes.
A ￿ at income tax as such has only been applied in Georgia and recently in Bulgaria. In all
other cases, the tax incidence on incomes is progressive, i.e. a single marginal ￿ at tax rate t is
combined with a general personal ￿ at tax allowance a. This is also what we consider in this
paper:
T = t ￿ max(taxbase ￿ a;0)
An important aspect which has been rarely addressed in previous studies is the setting
of tax system parameters for the ex ante analysis of hypothetical tax reforms. In terms of
￿ at tax reforms this translates into the question of how to set the ￿ at tax rate and the basic
allowance. In our case we are interested in the relationship between ￿ at tax parameters and
distributional e⁄ects.7 Davies and Hoy (2002) show theoretically that the inequality of after-tax
distribution of income is monotonically declining in the ￿ at tax rate and the associated level of
basic allowance generating the same tax yield.8 Furthermore, for revenue neutral tax reforms
replacing a graduated rate tax (GRT) with a ￿ at rate tax (FRT), they prove the existence of
critical ￿ at tax rates such that compared to the (existing) graduated rate tax after-tax income
6See OECD (2006) for more about dual income tax systems. These countries include e.g. the Scandinavian
countries.
7The setting of the key ￿ at tax design features (marginal rate, basic allowance, tax base) crucially depends
on the objective of the reform (like simplifying the system, improving compliance, broadening the tax base,
increasing or decreasing the tax burden for selected groups, higher, lower or constant revenue) and if other
reforms (like shifting tax burden between direct and indirect taxes or taxes and social insurance) are planned
to accompany the ￿ at tax introduction.
8As a ￿ at tax schedule has only two parameters - marginal rate and basic allowance - it is only possible to
choose one freely when accounting for revenue neutrality.
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Inequality according to index I
is less under GRT than under FRT
Inequality according to index I
is less under FRT than under GRT
0
Figure 1: Comparison of critical ￿ at tax rates
Source: Davies and Hoy (2002), p. 40.
Figure 1 illustrates these regularities. In other words: when moving from a graduated
income tax to a ￿ at tax system that yields the same revenue, three critical ￿ at tax rate values
with respect to after-tax income inequality exist. The ￿rst depends on the chosen inequality
index, the other two do not, i.e. they stem from the concept of Lorenz dominance. First,
for a given inequality index I, a ￿ at rate value t￿
F can be found such that inequality remains
unchanged. Further on, inequality in terms of this index is always higher (lower) below (above)
this critical value after the ￿ at tax introduction. Second, there exist a lower bound tl
F such that
for all marginal rates below this critical value inequality in terms of any inequality measure is
always higher than compared to the existing system (i.e. the existing graduated rate tax Lorenz
dominates the ￿ at tax). Third, inequality is always lower above an upper bound tu
F according to
any inequality index (i.e. the ￿ at tax Lorenz dominates the existing graduated rate tax). These
regularities apply to any inequality measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers
and under the assumption that behaviour is not a⁄ected by tax system changes.
The lower bound corresponds to a ￿ at tax rate if the personal allowance is ￿xed, i.e. is at
the same level as for the pre-reform graduated rate tax. The upper bound is such that a person
with the highest income pays the same tax under each scheme. Additionally, the ￿ at rate at
the lower bound is supposed to exceed the lowest marginal tax rate under the graduated rate
5and the ￿ at rate at the upper bound remains below the highest marginal tax rate under the
graduated rate. The critical value between those boundaries cannot be determined a priori as
it depends on a chosen inequality index.9
We rely on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical ￿ at tax re-
forms. However, these theoretical regularities are only approximations for empirical estimations
because existing tax systems are further complicated by the presence of other tax deductions
and allowances. Some systems do not even have a (well-de￿ned) basic allowance to start with.
More so, the de￿nition of revenue neutrality is not straightforward. If revenue neutrality is
only limited to income taxes then it might not preserve the mean of the disposable income
distribution, as there are often instruments whose eligibility or amount depend on net income
after taxes (e.g. means-tested non-taxable bene￿ts) and, therefore, might change their value
when tax systems are modi￿ed. If the overall net balance from taxes and bene￿ts is retained
then income tax revenues rarely remain constant. Further on, the premise of ex-ante revenue
neutrality (i.e. without behavioural responses) is a rather strong assumption but it is necessary
to apply the Davies and Hoy (2002) approach.10
In practice, most countries have introduced a ￿ at tax rate at or close to the level of previous
lowest marginal rate. Exceptions are Latvia and Lithuania who have chosen rates close to the
previous highest marginal rate (Nicodeme (2007)). The Slovak Republic and Estonia initially
opted for a rate in the middle range, although the latter is now gradually moving towards the
former lowest marginal rate as well. The pattern of setting basic allowances however is less
clear. In most countries an allowance in ￿xed amount was retained or introduced. Exceptions
include Russia with gradual withdrawal and Ukraine with sudden withdrawal above certain
income levels which makes the e⁄ective marginal tax rate high at some stages. However, the
amount of allowance varies signi￿cantly, most countries having it increased during the reforms
(Keen et al. (2007)). For example, Georgia has no allowance at all, the allowance in Russia was
about 12% of the average gross wage in the year before and after the reform (i.e. 2000-01), in
Estonia it was 40-74% of the minimum wage and 11-21% of the average gross wage in 1994-2006,
and in the Slovak Republic it exceeded the minimum wage and was about 60% of the average
wage in 2004, more than doubled with the reform (see Brook and Leibfritz (2005)).
9Chiu (2007) demonstrates further that for an index exhibiting downside inequality aversion this value is
determined by the strength of the index￿ s downside inequality aversion against its inequality aversion. In the
case of Generalized Entropy Indices E(￿), since a higher ￿ indicates a weaker downside inequality aversion
against inequality aversion, it also implies a higher critical ￿ at tax rate between the boundaries.
10If the scenarios were chosen to be revenue neutral ex-post, i.e. after labour supply reactions, the marginal
tax rates could be lower (higher) in case of increasing (decreasing) labour supply but the underlying research
question would be di⁄erent. Our aim is to analyse scenarios that are equal ex-ante and to reveal the ex-post
di⁄erences by analysing the economic e⁄ects of the scenarios in terms of equity and e¢ ciency.
63 Flat tax simulations
3.1 EUROMOD: model and database
We use the microsimulation technique to simulate taxes, bene￿ts and disposable incomes under
di⁄erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simulations are done
with EUROMOD, a static tax-bene￿t model covering the EU15 countries. EUROMOD was
built by a consortium of research institutions from each EU15 country with a good knowledge
and expertise in their national tax-bene￿t system. The model has been validated against
aggregated administrative statistics and national tax-bene￿t models (where available), and
found to perform satisfactorily.11
Our analysis is based on the 2003 tax-bene￿t systems, which is the most recent wave cur-
rently available in EUROMOD but limited to 10 countries, excluding Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy and Sweden (see also Figure 11 in Appendix A). The main stages of the simulations are
the following. First, a micro-data sample and tax-bene￿t rules are read into the model. Then
for each tax and bene￿t instrument, the model constructs corresponding units of assessment,
ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of bene￿t or tax
liability. The result is then either assigned to an individual or allocated to members of the
tax unit. Finally, after all taxes and bene￿ts in question are simulated, disposable income is
calculated.
EUROMOD is characterised by greater ￿ exibility than typical national models, to accom-
modate a range of di⁄erent tax-bene￿t systems. For instance, the model can easily handle
di⁄erent units of assessment, income de￿nitions for tax bases and bene￿t means-tests, the
order and structure of instruments. Overall, a common framework allows the comparison of
countries in a consistent way.
EUROMOD covers only monetary incomes, excluding capital gains and irregular incomes. It
can simulate most direct taxes and bene￿ts except those based on previous contributions as this
information is usually not available from the cross-sectional survey data used by EUROMOD
as input datasets. The model assumes full bene￿t take-up and tax compliance. Although the
latter is an important aspect of ￿ at tax reforms, we do not consider changes in compliance here
and limit our analysis to ￿rst-order static e⁄ects only.
Table 2 in Appendix A gives an overview of the input datasets for EUROMOD. Their sample
size varies across countries from less than 2,500 to more than 11,000 households. All monetary
variables are updated to year 2003 using country-speci￿c uprating factors, as the survey period
11For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2001) and Sutherland (2007). Additional informa-
tion including country reports regarding the detailled modelling of each country￿ s tax bene￿t system is available
at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/ .
7for incomes varies from 1999 to 2003. Where net incomes were recorded in the original data,
gross incomes have been also imputed. For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland
(2001) and Sutherland (2007).
3.2 Current income tax systems
The existing income tax systems in the 10 countries under consideration are quite varied. As
of 2003, all have graduated rate schedules with a number of brackets ranging from 3 (UK) to
16 (Luxembourg) and the highest marginal tax rate from 38% (Luxembourg) to about 55%
(Finland, state and local rate combined). All schedules are piecewise linear except that of
Germany which has a unique continuous function for tax rates at some income levels. Seven
countries have a general basic allowance, often integrated into the tax schedule; the Netherlands
and Portugal apply general (wastable) tax credits and Austria uses both elements. About half
of the countries tax capital income (and property income) together with other income and the
rest tax it separately applying a ￿ at rate (of 15-30%), in Belgium this is optional.
The countries also di⁄er in the unit of assessment. Again, half of them allow only individual
taxation, four countries apply either optional or compulsory joint taxation and Belgium provides
limited income sharing for married couples. Nevertheless, even systems based on individual
taxation often have elements assessed at family level or couple level (e.g. family or child
allowances) or allow the sharing of non-labour income or household expenditures (e.g. property
income, mortgage payments). Table 3 in Appendix A summarises these characteristics.
Overall, although there are few countries with relatively simple income tax systems (e.g.
UK), most of them can be characterised as complex systems with the combination of many dif-
ferent elements and varying tax units. Additional examples of complexities include progression
adjustments in Austria and Germany, income taxation both at the state and the local level in
Finland, and an integrated schedule of social insurance contributions and income tax in the
Netherlands.
3.3 Reform scenarios
In our ￿ at tax reform simulations we replace all existing personal income tax deductions,
allowances and credits with a single personal allowance (which is equivalent to a wastable, i.e.
non-refundable, tax credit), and each graduated rate schedule with a ￿ at rate. We only keep
refundable tax credits as these are equivalent to bene￿ts.12 In countries where capital income
was taxed at a separate rate, we abolish this separate rate and include capital income in the
12Examples include the lone parent tax credit in Austria, the tax credit for families with school children in
Greece, working mother tax credit in Spain and working tax credit and child credit in the UK.
8￿ at tax base. Therefore, our reform scenarios have a good potential to simplify the systems
(due to fewer speci￿c deductions) and make them more transparent.13
We do not attempt to harmonise tax bases across countries, we limit ourselves to income
taxes and do not modify existing social insurance contribution schemes (SIC)14 or bene￿ts. One
could also carry out an exercise of simply ￿ attening tax rate schedules without adjusting the
tax base, but this would result in higher ￿ at tax rates due to retained exceptions, therefore,
limiting gains in terms of incentives.
We simulate the following three ￿ at income tax scenarios for each country:
￿ a revenue neutral ￿ at rate with a basic allowance in the existing (or equivalent) amount
(S1),
￿ a 10 percentage points higher ￿ at rate compared to the ￿rst scenario and an increased
tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S2),
￿ a 20 percentage points higher ￿ at rate compared to the ￿rst scenario and an increased
tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S3).
All scenarios are revenue neutral with the total income tax revenue within ￿0.1% limits
of its baseline value. In terms of Davies and Hoy (2002) approach, our ￿rst scenario should
approximately correspond to the lower bound. Because of additional complexities discussed in
section 2 exact critical ￿ at tax rates cannot be identi￿ed in a straightforward manner. The 10
and 20 percentage point higher tax rate under the second and the third scenario are chosen to
explore the e⁄ect on inequality potentially around the upper bound.15
Figure 2 plots the ￿ at tax rate under each scenario and the lowest and highest (positive)
tax rate of the existing tax rate schedules. Because of revenue neutrality the tax allowance
is not independent of the tax rate. There is notable variation in the ￿ at tax rate under the
￿rst scenario (11.6-33.9%). This variation results from the combination of the underlying pre-
tax income distribution and average e⁄ective tax burden under the existing system. This also
a⁄ects the other two scenarios. However, it turns out that for most countries the range of ￿ at
tax rates under three scenarios roughly matches the range of existing tax rates. A notable
exception is the Netherlands with a very wide range of graduated tax rates.16
13Further on, abolishing speci￿c deductions and allowances (that may have di⁄erent values for di⁄erent
persons or income levels) and replacing them with one general allowance leads to a (slightly) broader tax base.
14The use of social insurance contributions di⁄ers considerably across European countries. Therefore, a SIC
reform would raise further conceptual questions, e.g. if mandatory contributions should be interpreted as taxes
or insurance premium.
15One could also construct scenarios with varying increases in the tax rates across countries generating the
same increase in inequality. This would lead to a slightly di⁄erent research question with the focus more on
the level of the tax rates than on inequality measures. We have chosen the approach of constant increases for
a better comparability of scenarios across countries in terms of distributional e⁄ects.
















Figure 2: Simulated ￿ at tax rates and existing lowest and highest marginal rate
As expected, ￿ at tax rates under the ￿rst scenario are above the lowest rates in the existing
schedules with only Portugal being slightly lower, which is possibly due to the elimination of
additional tax allowances. Flat tax rates under the third scenario are around the previous
highest marginal rates for six countries and below that for the rest.
4 Simulation results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. First, we analyse the distributional e⁄ects
of the di⁄erent scenarios. This is followed by the presentation of the progressivity e⁄ects and
then summarised by the share of winners and losers. Finally, we demonstrate how e⁄ective
average and marginal tax rates change according to the simulated reform scenarios.17
rather low income tax rates for the brackets where full contributions to the ￿People￿ s Pensions Insurance￿have
to be paid and rather high rates above the SIC threshold.
17When interpreting the results, one has to be aware of the fact that revenue neutrality in terms of (overall)
tax payments does not necessarily imply a constant mean disposable income. This mainly depends on mean-
tested bene￿ts which are calculated on the basis of after-tax net income.
104.1 Inequality, poverty, richness and polarisation
We compute a number of distributional measures to cover several aspects of distribution: in-
equality, polarisation, poverty and richness. These are based on equivalised household dispos-
able incomes.18 To analyse income inequality we use the Gini coe¢ cient and the Generalised
Entropy indices with sensitivity parameters ￿ = 0 (Mean Log Deviation), ￿ = 1 (Theil index)
and ￿ = 2. Figure 3 presents the Gini coe¢ cient for each scenario, other measures are presented
















Figure 3: Income inequality by the Gini coe¢ cient
First, there are already distinct di⁄erences between the countries in terms of disposable
income inequality in the baseline scenario which can be to some extent explained by the gross
income distribution. Two groups are a⁄erent: inequality is rather high in Southern European
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the UK, and is rather low in Continental Europe
(Austria, Germany and the Benelux countries) and Finland. This classi￿cation of countries
corresponds to the typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) who di⁄erentiates between three types
of welfare states: conservative (Continental Europe), social-democratic (Nordic Europe) and
18We use the modi￿ed OECD equivalence scale which weights the household head with a factor of 1, household
members aged 14 and older with 0.5, and under 14 with 0.3. The household net income is divided by the sum
of the individual weights of each member (=equivalence factor) to compute the equivalent household income.
11liberal (Anglo-Saxon). Ferrera (1996) further adds a fourth category (Mediterranean) to this
typology.
Introducing a revenue neutral ￿ at tax increases inequality unambiguously only under the
￿rst scenario (S1), i.e. the lower bound. In the second scenario (S2) inequality decreases
relative to the baseline for Finland and the UK (depending on the inequality measure for the
latter) and in the third scenario (S3) also for Belgium, Germany, Greece and Portugal.19 These
di⁄erences between countries can be explained to some extent by di⁄erent tax systems and the
resulting distribution of tax payments. The latter is rather narrow in Belgium, Finland and the
UK, where inequality decreases, with a spread of the e⁄ective average tax rate in the baseline
between the lowest and highest decile of less than 20 percentage points whereas this spread in
most other countries is around or well above 30 percentage points.20
The scenarios can be ranked according to the level of inequality as follows: I(S1) > I(S2) >
I(S3).21 The increases in inequality, however, are similar in absolute terms for most countries
with FI and UK being slightly lower. The fact that inequality levels under the third scenario
are below or close to those in the baseline scenario show that they correspond approximately
to the critical value or upper boundary respectively.22
To analyse the e⁄ects of ￿ at taxes on poverty we compute the headcount index and the
measures of Foster et al. (1984) based on the poverty line taken from the baseline scenario.23
We compute the poverty lines as 60% of median equivalent income for each country. The results
for the headcount ratio (FGT0) are plotted in Figure 4 and the full results are presented in
Table 5 (Appendix B). Measuring richness is a much less considered ￿eld in the literature than
poverty. We compute the headcount index and the measures of Peichl et al. (2006) which are
analogously de￿ned to the FGT indices of poverty. The richness line is computed as 200% of
median equivalent income. The results for the headcount ratio are presented in Figure 5 and
the full results in Table 6 (Appendix B).24
Again, there are distinct di⁄erences between countries in the baseline levels of poverty and
19These derived results are in line with comparable scenarios from single country studies. Fuest et al. (2008),
for example, ￿nd a similar increase in inequality for scenario S1 and one close to S2 for Germany.
20This spread, however, is largest for Greece although a similar development can be observed as for low-
spread countries. But when taking a closer look at the distribution of tax payments it can be seen that it
is right-skewed and the spread between deciles one and nine is below 20 pp. See subsection 4.2 and Table 9
(Appendix C) for further information.
21This ordering is stable when using any inequality index presented in Table 7 (Appendix B).
22Inequality under S3 is lower for those countries where ￿ at tax rate under S3 is close or exceeds previous
highest rate (GR, UK, GE, BE, FI), except LU, and additionally for PT.
23We ￿x the poverty and richness lines at the baseline level to account for (possible) changes in median
income. Otherwise, if we would allow for changing poverty (richness) lines an increasing measure of poverty
(or a decreasing index of richness) would not necessarily indicate a worse situation for people with low (high)
incomes as a result of the changing poverty (richness) line.
24One should note, though, that measuring richness depends on the quality of micro data as the upper tail















Figure 4: Poverty rates by the headcount ratio (with constant poverty line), %
richness. The same two groups of countries can be distinguished: like inequality, poverty and
richness are rather high in Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the
UK, and low in Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium Germany, Luxembourg) and Finland.
Poverty increases in terms of all measures in all scenarios compared to the baseline, except
for the Netherlands in S3 and Finland and the UK in S2 and S3. When analysing poverty,
one has to take into account the fact that the lowest deciles of the income distribution seldom
pay income taxes. There is, therefore, limited scope for a reduction in income poverty through
reduced marginal tax rates. The pattern of changes in richness measures matches closely the
inequality measures, i.e. increasing richness in the ￿rst scenario for all countries and measures,
decreasing richness for Finland and the UK in the second scenario relative to the baseline
and additionally for Belgium and Germany in the third scenario. These e⁄ects di⁄er slightly
when using more sophisticated richness measures (R￿) that also account for changes in the
dimension of richness and not only the number of people above a richness line. Richness is then
also decreasing for Portugal and Greece in S3.














Figure 5: Richness rates by the headcount ratio (with constant richness line), %
(2004).25 The results are presented in Figure 6. The polarisation of the income distribution
is high in Southern countries and the UK and low in Continental Europe and Finland. A
high income polarisation describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an
increasing gap between rich and poor. Therefore, the middle class is of less importance in the
Southern countries and the UK. And indeed, in these countries, which have high baseline values
of inequality, inequality decreases in scenario S3 (and S2 in the UK). The polarisation increases
in most countries and scenarios (except for Finland and the UK in S2 and S3) implying a further
declining middle class (see Table 7 in Appendix B). This measure is therefore summarising the
e⁄ects on poverty and richness.
25Schmidt (2004) creates a polarisation index which in analogy to the Gini index (Lorenz curve) is based
on a polarisation curve for better comparability of the results and their interpretations. Generally speaking,
polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising income polarisation describes the phenomenon of a
declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap between rich and poor. The proportion of middle income














Figure 6: Polarisation by the Schmidt index
4.2 Progressivity
To analyse the impact of ￿ at tax reforms on the redistributive e⁄ects of the tax system we
compute several measures of tax progression.26 Figure 7 presents the values for the Suits index.
In terms of progression the di⁄erences between the countries in the baseline scenario are rather
small. Therefore it is not easy to distinguish homogeneous groups of countries in terms of tax
progression. Progression is lowest in Spain and Luxembourg, whereas it is highest in Greece
and the UK. Tax progression decreases under scenario S1 with a low tax rate in all countries
in comparison to the baseline scenario, i.e. the incidence is more proportional. The values
for scenario S2 depend on the country, whereas progressivity increases in S3 for all countries.
Nevertheless the scenarios can be ranked in terms of all indices of progression in the following
way: IPR(S1) < IPR(S2) < IPR(S3):
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields gainers and losers. Di⁄erent
26We compute the measure of e⁄ective progression by Musgrave and Thin (1948), PMT = 1￿GY
1￿GX , the indices
of disproportionality by Kakwani (1977), PK = CT ￿ GX, Suits (1977), PS = 1 ￿ L
K; where K denotes the
area below the line of proportionality, and L denotes the area below the Lorenz curve of tax payments against
income, and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), PRS = GX ￿ CY , as well as the redistributive e⁄ect (of taxes)
PRE = GX ￿ GY (with Y disposable income, X gross income, T taxes, G Gini coe¢ cient and C coe¢ cient of













Figure 7: Tax progression by the Suits index
groups of taxpayers are a⁄ected di⁄erently by tax schedule ￿ attening and tax base broadening.27
In the ￿rst scenario with the lowest tax rates the gains are solely concentrated in the top 1-2
deciles (only in Belgium also involving the 7th and 8th deciles). In the second scenario, some
9th decile households start losing instead of gaining; in the case of Finland and the UK the
top decile loses as well while the bottom and middle deciles start gaining. In the third scenario
only three countries are left with gains for the top decile (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Spain). In addition to Finland and the UK, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain also
show gains for the lowest deciles. Germany under the third scenario is an exceptional case as
only the middle income deciles gain.
The changes in mean disposable income are increasing (decreasing) with ￿ at tax parameters
(i.e. marginal tax rate and basic allowance) for low (high) income households. In other words,
the lower (higher) the ￿ at tax parameters the higher (lower) are the gains (losses) for high (low)
income households. In most countries the relative losses in terms of disposable income remain
high (or are even highest) for middle income households. These groups, however, usually play
27See Table 8 in Appendix C for the e⁄ect in terms of changes in mean disposable income by deciles. The
range of changes is somewhat higher for the ￿rst (from -9.7% to +12.1%) and the third scenario (-13.1% to
8.0%) compared with the second scenario (-5.5% to 6.2%).
16an important role in the political process of a mature welfare state. Thus, these e⁄ects might
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Figure 8: Share of winners and losers, %
Figure 8 summarises gainers and losers29 by presenting the shares for each. There are more
losers than winners in every country under the ￿rst scenario. Belgium, Finland and Germany
show about the same share of winners and losers under the second scenario, while Greece,
Portugal and the UK have most of the people with unchanged income. In the third scenario,
only Austria and Luxembourg have still more losers; Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal
have again roughly the same share of those gaining and losing and most people in Greece
remain still in the ￿ no-change￿category. The highest fraction of winners appears in Belgium
and Finland for all scenarios and it is increasing over scenarios for most countries (except for
Austria, Germany and Greece). If disposable income was chosen as the only criterion for an
28Fuest et al. (2008) for Germany and Jacobs et al. (2007) for the Netherlands ￿nd similar results for
comparable scenarios.
29Households whose disposable income does not change more than 10 euros per month in either direction are
regarded as ￿ unchanged￿. See also Table 11 in Appendix C.
17election decision, only the third ￿ at tax scenario would have a majority in the population (in
the sense of more winners than losers) for most countries.
4.3 Work incentives: e⁄ective average and marginal tax rates
In this section, we analyse the e⁄ects of ￿ at tax reforms on the e⁄ective marginal (EMTR)
and average (EATR) income tax rates faced by di⁄erent groups of taxpayers as a measure for
e¢ ciency e⁄ects. The underlying idea is that average and marginal income tax rates a⁄ect
labour supply and savings incentives. Therefore, changes in e⁄ective income tax rates may be
considered as rough indicators for distortions caused by the tax system.30 E⁄ective marginal
tax rate shows at which rate an additional unit of income is taxed, whereas e⁄ective average
tax rate shows the proportion of total taxes (including SICs) to market income.31 Changes in
e⁄ective average tax rates are of special interest for the extensive labour supply margin which
seems to be more important for particular subgroups at the bottom of the income distribution
than the intensive margin which is a⁄ected by the e⁄ective marginal tax rate (see Heckman
(1993) and Immervoll et al. (2007)).
Figures 9 and 10 present EMTRs and EATRs for the ￿ at tax scenarios.32 Both measures
already di⁄er distinctively in the baseline scenario across countries. This can be attributed to
several factors like, for example, the overall size of the government (and therefore the demand
for public funds) and the general tax mix (i.e. the importance of the income tax) as well as
economic di⁄erences between the countries. Mediterranean countries with the lowest EMTRs
and EATRs have rather low income levels as well as the lowest relative levels of income taxation
and social insurance contributions resulting in high inequality and polarisation of the income
distribution. Finland and the UK which have average ETRs attribute much more importance to
the income tax whereas social insurance contributions are relatively low. These social insurance
contributions, however, play an important role in ￿nancing the Continental European welfare
states where SIC are almost as high as income taxes 33
30One should note, though, that average EMTRs and EATRs, in general, do not allow deriving conclusions
for the expected labour supply reactions of individuals. These depend on the individual e⁄ective tax rates and
their respective labour supply elasticities.
31We calculate EMTRs for the working age population (those aged 18-64) with positive employment or self-
employment income, increasing earnings of each individual in the household in turn by 3% while the change
in all bene￿ts and taxes (including social insurance contributions) is observed at the household level. We use
the following formula: EMTRi = 1￿
￿Yj
di , where di is the income increment for individual i and Yj disposable
income of household j to which this individual belongs. The e⁄ective average tax rate is also calculated for
the working age population as: EATRi = Ti
Xi, where Ti is total tax payments and Xi the market income of
individual i.
32See Tables 12, 13 and 14 in the appendix for the detailed results. The concentration (polarisation) of the
EMTR distribution decreases (increases) with an increasing marginal tax rate, i.e. more people face low or high
EMTRs whereas less individuals face medium EMTRs.
















Figure 9: E⁄ective marginal tax rates (mean), %
The e⁄ective marginal tax burden is rather low in Mediterranean countries like Greece,
Spain and Portugal; average in Luxembourg, UK, Finland and the Netherlands, and rather
high in Austria, Germany and Belgium. The scenarios can be ranked in the following way
(for most countries): EMTR(S1) < EMTR(S2) < EMTR(S3): Therefore, e⁄ective marginal
rates are increasing with statutory rates although revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the
EMTRs decrease in all countries in comparison to the baseline, scenarios S2 and S3 depend on
the country.
The e⁄ective average tax burden is rather low in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Luxembourg;
average in the UK, the Netherlands and Austria; and rather high in Finland, Belgium and
Germany. The scenarios can be ranked as follows: EATR(S1) > EATR(S2) > EATR(S3):
Therefore, increasing the allowance dominates the increase in (statutory) marginal rate and
leads to decreasing EATRs although the revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the EATRs
increase in all countries (except BE) in comparison to the baseline, scenario S3 is always lower
and S2 depends on the country.
To sum up, ￿ at tax rates required to attain revenue neutrality with existing personal allow-

















Figure 10: E⁄ective average tax rates (mean), %
incentives.34 On the other hand, (revenue neutral) ￿ at rates necessary to keep the inequality
levels close to their baseline values (the third scenario) lead to ambiguous e⁄ects. Incentives
improve in Mediterranean and most Continental countries but worsen in other countries.
4.4 Summary of results
There are already distinct di⁄erences between the analysed countries under the present systems.
In terms of distributional measures two groups of countries can be di⁄erentiated: inequality,
(relative) poverty and richness and polarisation are rather high in Southern European countries
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the UK, whereas they are rather low in Continental Europe
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg) and Finland.
The variation in the e⁄ects of the scenarios across countries is summarised in Table 1.
Di⁄erent groups can be classi￿ed according to the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen
34One should note, however, that higher incentives do not necessarily lead to higher labour supply and
welfare but depend on the directions of the income and substitution e⁄ects based on the respective labour
supply elasticities. However, recent studies for the Netherlands by Jacobs et al. (2007) and Germany by Fuest
et al. (2008) are comparable with our scenarios S1 and S2. In summary, these studies ￿nd and increase in labour
supply (and inequality) for scenario S1, whereas in scenario S2 inequality is held constant resulting in negligible
e¢ ciency e⁄ects.
20(1990). In the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries inequality, poverty and richness increase (and
progression decreases) only in scenario S1. In the Southern European countries inequality in-
creases in scenarios S1 and S2. In Continental Europe inequality increases in all three scenarios
(except Germany). Incentives increase in all countries for scenarios S1 and S2 (except FI and
UK) as well as for Mediterranean and Continental countries in scenario S3.
Ineq./Pov./Rich. Polarisation LS incentives
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
AT + + + + + + + + -
BE + + (~) + + + + + -
Continental GE + + (~) + + + + + +
LU + + + + + + + + (~)
NL + + (+) + + ~ + + (+)
Nordic FI + - - + - - + - -
Anglo-Saxon UK + (-) - + - - + - -
GR + + - + ~ - (~) (~) (+)
Southern PT + + - + ~ ~ + + +
SP + + (~) + + ~ + + (~)
Table 1: Summary of simulation results
Note: the symbols have the following meanings: + / - : signi￿cant increase (decrease) in all
measures considered, (+) / (-): signi￿cant increase (decrease) in most measures, (~): ambiguous
results or no signi￿cant changes.
Our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters is crucial for
the e⁄ects of ￿ at tax reforms in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. Low parameter values that attain
revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances decrease EMTRs and therefore increase
labour supply incentives. This, however, leads to more inequality, poverty and polarisation
as low rates bene￿t mainly those with high incomes at the expense of low and middle income
households. On the other hand, higher ￿ at rates keep the inequality levels unchanged. However,
this does not necessarily imply strong disincentive e⁄ects for all countries. In fact, for some
countries the EMTRs decrease in all three scenarios resulting in increasing incentives even in
for scenario S3 with a high marginal rate.
5 Conclusion
Flat income taxes have become increasingly popular in Eastern Europe. However, this pop-
ularity has not yet reached Western European countries with well-established middle classes.
Using EUROMOD we provide a microsimulation analysis of di⁄ert ￿ at tax designs for selected
Western European countries in a common framework.
21In general, a revenue neutral ￿ at tax reform cannot overcome the fundamental equity-
e¢ ciency trade-o⁄. However, in some cases such as Greece, Portugal and Spain an increase in
both equity and incentives is possible. These countries have the typical Mediterranean welfare
state regime which can be seen as a rudimentary version of the Conservative (Continental)
welfare system with a lack of a minimum income scheme. These welfare states provide a rather
low level of social security (comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries) based on low levels
of taxes and redistribution. However, they also use contribution-based Bismarckian social
insurance systems providing bene￿ts depending on the level of previously earned income (like
the Continental countries). Furthermore, emphasis is put on the role of the family as being
a major part of the social care system. The income tax contributes only a minor part to
the government budget (i.e. less than 10% of GDP), whereas indirect taxes are much more
important and the social expenditures in general are lower (i.e. around 20% of GDP) in
comparison to other types of welfares states.35
As a consequence of its design, the Mediterranean welfare state regime is characterised by
high inequality, poverty, richness and polarisation of the disposable income distribution. These
distributional characteristics imply a lack of a well-established middle class. Therefore, the
distributional e⁄ects of a ￿ at tax reform that burdends the middle class are less adverse than in
countries with a more equal income distribution. Switching to a ￿ at tax regime in this setting
can reduce inequality and increase e¢ ciency in terms of labour supply incentives. However, the
resulting marginal ￿ at tax rates are still rather high.
When interpreting these results, one has to be aware of the fact that we limit our analysis
to static models. However, ￿ at taxes are also supposed to have positive dynamic e¢ ciency
and growth e⁄ects.36 These long-term e⁄ects might make increasing inequality acceptable.
Nevertheless, the question arises whether a personal income tax reform is the best instrument
to increase growth and employment. The user costs of labour and capital play an important role
in determining the labour and investment demand. These user costs, however, are determined
more by social security contributions and corporate taxes than by personal income tax.
Nevertheless, the immediate and short-term distributional e⁄ects analysed in this paper are
most likely to be decisive for the political feasibility of a ￿ at tax reform. The main problem of
implementing a ￿ at rate tax could be to convince a majority of the population that redistri-
bution in favour of the highest income decile is acceptable. These distributional e⁄ects at the
expense of the middle class help to explain why ￿ at rate taxes have not been successful in the
political process in Western Europe. However, our analysis shows that for some Mediterranean
countries a ￿ at tax can increase both equity and e¢ ciency. This also suggests that these and
35See e.g. European Commission (2007), Eurostat (2006).
36Cf. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) or Cassou and Lansing (2004).
22other countries with similar income distributions and welfare state structures are more prone
to follow such reforms.
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25Appendices
A EUROMOD
Figure 11: Existing (as of April 2008) and simulated ￿ at tax systems in Europe






AT Austrian version of EU-SILC 4,521 2004 annual 2003
BE Panel Survey on Belgian Households 2,975 2002 annual 2001
FI Income distribution survey 10,736 2001 annual 2001
GE German Socio-Economic Panel 11,303 2002 annual 2001
GR Household Budget Survey 6,555 2004/5 annual 2003/4
LU PSELL-2 2,431 2001 annual 2000
NL Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek 4,329 2000 annual 1999
PT European Community Household Panel 4,588 2001 annual 2000
SP European Community Household Panel 5,048 2000 annual 1999
UK Family Expenditure Survey 6,634 2000/1 month in 2000/1





Highest rate Form of the main tax
relief
Capital taxation Tax unit
AT 4 21% 50% 0% tax bracket, tax
credit
￿at tax (25%) individual
BE 5 25% 50% tax allowance optional ￿at tax (15%) some sharing




0% tax bracket (state),
tax allowance (local)
￿at tax (29%) individual
GE 4 19.9% 48.5% 0% tax bracket integrated optional joint
GR 3 15% 40% 0% tax bracket integrated individual
LU 16 8% 38% 0% tax bracket integrated joint
NL 4 1.7% 52% tax credit ￿at tax (30%) individual
PT 6 12% 40% tax credit ￿at tax (20%) joint
SP 5 15% 45% tax allowance integrated optional joint
UK 3 10% 40% tax allowance one bracket slightly reduced individual
Table 3: Income tax systems, 2003
Original Income Taxes SIC Bene￿ts
AT 98.74 19.99 16.75 38.01
BE 108.20 28.31 13.06 38.27
FI 103.69 30.62 5.27 32.14
GE 108.06 21.16 17.24 30.30
GR 93.94 9.79 13.78 29.63
LU 94.45 13.65 11.86 31.05
NL 114.30 13.57 21.53 20.84
PT 100.40 12.08 10.02 21.70
SP 97.42 16.07 5.78 24.48
UK 107.15 22.79 5.82 21.46
Table 4: Mean value of income components in relation to DPI, 2003 in %
27B Inequality, poverty and richness
PL FGT0 (HCR) FGT1 FGT2
Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3
AT 859.22 11.06 16.19 13.70 12.61 1.93 2.97 2.45 2.25 0.58 0.87 0.73 0.69
BE 809.52 10.00 14.68 11.97 10.94 3.39 4.10 3.74 3.63 1.99 2.25 2.16 2.14
FI 838.33 12.24 12.76 9.95 9.64 2.17 2.17 1.75 1.74 0.63 0.60 0.52 0.52
GE 801.56 13.04 15.06 13.88 13.38 2.74 3.00 2.84 2.81 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.00
GR 437.40 19.48 20.54 19.51 19.50 6.36 6.50 6.37 6.36 3.34 3.37 3.34 3.34
LU 1,274.24 9.31 14.64 11.83 10.72 1.10 2.09 1.46 1.30 0.25 0.46 0.31 0.28
NL 871.00 11.87 14.87 12.93 11.41 2.37 2.82 2.42 2.28 1.20 1.30 1.19 1.16
PT 347.43 20.89 23.65 21.22 21.44 4.75 5.59 4.78 4.71 1.40 1.71 1.40 1.38
SP 548.13 19.18 22.89 20.26 19.21 5.40 6.78 5.75 5.41 2.47 3.03 2.58 2.47
UK 575.07 16.17 17.16 15.38 15.08 3.00 3.13 2.90 2.88 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.03
Table 5: Poverty line and rate
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: PL: poverty line, FGT￿: Foster et al. (1984) poverty measure.
RL R0 (HCR) R1 R2
Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3 Base S1 S2 S3
AT 2,864.06 5.19 7.68 6.12 5.08 1.02 1.83 1.40 1.03 0.35 0.70 0.51 0.36
BE 2,698.39 3.72 6,67 5.17 3.61 0.78 1.37 0.97 0.72 0.32 0.51 0.37 0.28
FI 2,794.42 5.06 5.88 4.65 3.43 1.23 1.52 1.12 0.79 0.53 0.65 0.47 0.33
GE 2,671.85 7.79 9.79 8.03 7.07 1.48 2.16 1.66 1.29 0.46 0.76 0.55 0.39
GR 1,458.00 9.81 10.82 10.21 10.00 2.24 2.77 2.46 2.23 0.82 1.13 0.95 0.80
LU 4,247.46 6.41 10.72 8.71 7.88 1.22 2.37 1.86 1.51 0.38 0.86 0.63 0.47
NL 2,905.09 5.46 7.20 6.36 5.18 0.96 1.63 1.28 1.01 0.29 0.59 0.44 0.34
PT 1,158.09 13.51 15.36 13.44 14.12 4.16 5.31 4.34 4.00 1.83 2.59 1.98 1.69
SP 1,827.09 10.18 12.57 11.42 9.99 2.12 3.26 2.60 2.11 0.70 1.25 0.93 0.71
UK 1,921.48 10.51 11.19 9.73 8.30 2.40 2.86 2.23 1.76 0.87 1.12 0.83 0.61
Table 6: Richness line and rate
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29C Distribution of tax payments and disposable income
AT BE FI GE GR
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 -8.01 -4.44 -2.79 -7.05 -3.68 -2.46 0.70 5.27 5.83 -1.18 -0.54 -0.51 -0.13 0.01 0.01
2 -9.70 -5.51 -2.73 -8.19 -4.09 -1.34 -1.47 4.80 7.98 -3.62 -1.19 -0.05 -1.29 -0.04 0.08
3 -8.22 -4.76 -1.73 -9.01 -5.07 -1.15 -1.51 3.96 7.72 -5.14 -1.40 0.97 -1.90 -0.40 0.22
4 -7.51 -4.44 -1.68 -6.48 -2.98 0.21 -1.72 2.54 6.17 -4.76 -1.46 1.05 -2.66 -0.66 0.47
5 -6.04 -3.53 -1.24 -4.38 -1.19 1.59 -1.90 0.51 3.07 -4.32 -1.84 0.53 -2.65 -0.95 0.22
6 -4.73 -3.04 -0.99 -1.59 -0.30 1.22 -1.90 -0.71 1.01 -3.49 -1.12 1.20 -2.89 -1.43 -0.26
7 -3.42 -2.57 -1.47 0.27 0.79 1.75 -1.35 -1.36 -0.67 -2.64 -1.27 0.31 -2.90 -1.39 -0.21
8 -1.70 -1.85 -1.27 2.26 1.31 0.81 -1.13 -2.26 -2.56 -1.59 -1.14 -0.34 -2.01 -0.96 0.11
9 1.21 -0.45 -1.19 4.24 2.28 1.00 0.07 -2.58 -4.41 0.70 -0.88 -1.88 -1.71 -0.94 0.38
10 11.57 5.16 -0.52 9.26 2.63 -3.49 3.62 -5.01 -13.13 7.38 2.02 -2.68 6.88 2.51 -0.89
LU NL PT SP UK
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
1 -8.08 -2.64 -1.13 -3.41 0.14 1.29 -3.66 0.10 0.21 -7.59 -0.82 0.26 -0.58 0.54 0.66
2 -9.15 -4.36 -2.11 -4.34 -1.05 0.70 -5.38 -0.34 0.42 -9.22 -2.89 0.05 -1.32 1.44 2.54
3 -8.16 -3.99 -1.54 -5.09 -1.66 0.11 -6.42 -1.69 -0.30 -8.08 -3.05 0.15 -1.99 1.43 3.23
4 -8.75 -5.23 -2.94 -4.60 -2.16 -0.43 -6.45 -0.35 0.89 -7.51 -3.43 -0.84 -2.24 1.80 4.27
5 -7.92 -5.30 -3.51 -3.86 -2.08 -0.53 -6.08 -0.69 1.30 -5.76 -2.36 0.41 -2.45 1.15 4.21
6 -6.10 -4.61 -2.79 -2.50 -1.59 -0.41 -6.57 -0.88 1.78 -5.30 -2.53 -0.12 -2.40 0.50 3.17
7 -4.58 -4.42 -3.73 -2.53 -2.08 -1.10 -5.82 -1.02 1.77 -2.65 -1.34 0.28 -2.15 -0.07 2.45
8 -2.65 -2.97 -2.51 -0.88 -1.21 -1.03 -4.07 -1.60 1.84 -0.81 -1.20 -0.69 -1.42 -0.85 0.31
9 2.63 0.45 -0.46 1.37 -0.10 -0.73 0.06 -1.08 0.95 1.76 -0.16 -0.67 -0.48 -1.60 -1.61
10 12.05 6.16 1.51 9.75 4.91 0.95 11.24 2.59 -2.99 11.79 5.19 0.05 6.23 -0.26 -5.77
Table 8: Changes in disposable income by income decile, %






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32D E¢ ciency: e⁄ective average and marginal tax rate
AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
Base median 26.56 33.39 27.41 33.70 19.45 17.73 26.55 13.92 13.62 24.71
mean 24.56 29.55 27.00 31.27 18.41 19.86 22.23 16.49 13.65 22.18
S1 median 31.61 32.87 30.01 36.87 21.56 22.44 28.78 19.85 18.80 26.10
mean 28.69 29.20 27.67 32.21 20.15 22.43 24.13 19.73 16.67 23.36
S2 median 29.55 32.48 29.89 31.92 19.45 20.90 29.13 13.52 15.21 23.82
mean 26.54 28.33 27.46 30.25 18.99 20.42 22.85 16.20 14.39 21.05
S3 median 26.02 31.37 28.81 26.56 19.45 17.74 26.76 11.00 8.60 19.23
mean 25.03 27.52 26.83 28.85 18.21 19.66 22.02 14.92 12.53 19.39
Table 12: E⁄ective average tax rates at the individual level
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: EATR de￿ned as (Income tax + SIC) / (market income). Includes individuals aged 18-64 with
employment income but no self-employment and replacement incomes
AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
Base median 41.04 51.02 43.40 50.01 19.45 35.46 45.36 23.00 28.83 31.40
mean 40.16 59.90 38.07 45.20 21.87 34.76 38.45 25.72 24.11 35.30
S1 median 35.37 40.54 39.62 45.98 21.40 26.85 33.26 21.32 22.88 31.90
mean 35.59 50.76 35.60 39.66 22.02 27.84 32.76 23.92 19.43 34.17
S2 median 43.62 49.23 49.16 49.87 19.45 35.94 32.27 21.60 27.65 41.90
mean 39.52 55.57 40.19 42.85 21.89 31.29 35.78 25.08 23.76 38.65
S3 median 51.66 57.93 58.70 49.59 19.45 38.52 39.00 11.00 37.65 49.20
mean 42.49 60.42 44.41 44.85 21.62 32.70 37.64 22.74 24.11 40.18
Table 13: E⁄ective marginal tax rates at the individual level
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: EMTR de￿ned as [1 ￿(change in hh disposable income) / (increase in individual earnings)]
and includes individuals aged 18-64 with positive earnings.
33AT BE FI GE GR LU NL PT SP UK
Base < 0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
[0-0.1) 6.3 0.5 12.0 8.5 24.2 0.6 5.5 8.9 21.3 4.4
[0.1-0.2) 11.5 1.9 5.8 1.3 32.4 21.3 0.5 28.8 4.6 1.6
[0.2-0.3) 0.9 0.9 7.6 7.9 10.3 18.2 10.8 29.5 44.4 9.5
[0.3-0.4) 12.5 4.5 14.0 11.7 11.0 25.6 10.4 17.6 25.8 61.6
[0.4-0.5) 59.9 25.5 41.6 20.2 21.3 29.6 57.0 11.5 3.6 12.1
[0.5-0.6) 6.1 57.9 16.1 40.9 0.8 1.4 8.5 0.4 0.0 1.1
[0.6-0.7) 0.1 0.6 0.6 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 4.2
[0.7-0.8) 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 3.0
[0.8-0.9) 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.0 1.0
[0.9-1) 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.4
> 1 2.5 6.3 1.2 1.1 0.0 3.0 2.6 0.3 0.2 1.1
S1 < 0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
[0-0.1) 4.0 1.0 14.6 12.0 19.9 0.5 4.8 3.5 7.9 4.4
[0.1-0.2) 0.4 2.4 0.7 0.7 16.4 16.7 15.4 16.0 37.8 0.1
[0.2-0.3) 10.7 0.1 0.9 21.7 25.3 76.2 23.3 57.3 53.9 18.8
[0.3-0.4) 78.3 28.8 76.8 6.1 37.7 3.3 16.7 19.4 0.0 65.0
[0.4-0.5) 3.3 57.6 3.2 47.0 0.7 0.0 7.7 0.1 0.0 1.0
[0.5-0.6) 0.1 0.5 0.5 6.8 0.0 0.1 24.3 0.2 0.0 0.3
[0.6-0.7) 0.0 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 4.3
[0.7-0.8) 0.1 0.5 0.8 2.8 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 3.5
[0.8-0.9) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.0 1.1
[0.9-1) 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.5
> 1 2.9 6.8 1.2 1.2 0.0 2.4 2.6 1.1 0.2 1.1
S2 < 0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
[0-0.1) 6.2 1.8 20.6 14.4 25.9 0.7 5.2 4.7 24.4 11.0
[0.1-0.2) 10.2 6.8 0.9 1.0 31.2 26.5 0.3 37.7 0.3 3.9
[0.2-0.3) 0.8 0.1 0.7 13.5 1.0 9.9 27.1 10.6 28.7 1.0
[0.3-0.4) 10.4 0.3 1.0 17.6 18.6 56.9 31.9 32.8 46.3 18.0
[0.4-0.5) 69.8 74.2 71.5 5.2 22.7 2.9 2.4 10.6 0.0 57.7
[0.5-0.6) 0.0 8.4 2.4 29.5 0.5 0.1 25.4 0.1 0.0 0.8
[0.6-0.7) 0.1 0.3 0.5 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.5
[0.7-0.8) 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 3.2
[0.8-0.9) 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.0 2.6
[0.9-1) 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.5
> 1 2.4 6.5 1.0 1.1 0.0 2.7 2.6 0.3 0.2 1.1
S3 < 0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
[0-0.1) 6.4 1.9 25.1 15.4 28.6 0.7 5.5 8.0 43.1 20.3
[0.1-0.2) 20.2 11.4 1.1 2.2 38.9 40.9 0.2 58.1 0.5 6.7
[0.2-0.3) 1.6 0.3 0.7 20.4 1.7 1.5 12.5 0.4 0.4 1.1
[0.3-0.4) 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.4 9.5 37.0 23.7 23.9 1.2
[0.4-0.5) 11.3 0.4 1.2 16.9 16.3 42.2 22.3 0.6 31.9 21.1
[0.5-0.6) 57.7 72.0 66.9 2.4 14.2 2.1 3.8 0.0 0.0 43.8
[0.6-0.7) 0.0 6.0 1.9 28.7 0.0 0.0 12.0 5.9 0.1 1.0
[0.7-0.8) 0.0 0.5 0.4 10.8 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1
[0.8-0.9) 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.0 2.6
[0.9-1) 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 1.1
> 1 2.4 5.9 0.8 1.1 0.0 2.8 2.5 0.3 0.2 1.1
Table 14: Distribution of e⁄ective marginal tax rates by intervals (%)
Sources: own calculation using EUROMOD version C13.
Note: EMTR de￿ned as [1 ￿(change in hh disposable income) / (increase in individual earnings)]
and includes individuals aged 18-64 with positive earnings.
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